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 Snyder v. Phelps, a recent U.S. Supreme Court Case, appears to have had a vast 
but infrequently discussed impact on First Amendment law. In particular, the case 
changed the way Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claims are decided. Snyder 
v. Phelps shifted the manner in which speech is analyzed away from the method of 
analysis present in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. Rather than focusing mainly on 
what the status is of the target of speech, Snyder requires one first, and possibly only, 
look to the dominant thrust of the speech. If the dominant thrust of speech is on a matter 
of public concern, the speech receives Constitutional protection regardless of who it was 
targeted at. This thesis will explore the Court's analysis and the broad implications of the 
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The Implications of Snyder v. Phelps 
 
I. Introduction 
 Snyder v. Phelps is a Supreme Court case which briefly weighed on the minds of 
many Americans. This case is fairly notorious, but that notoriety is based almost entirely 
upon the controversial nature of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) rather than on the 
inherent legal issues at work. While the facts of the case may be sensational, the decision 
is far more interesting. In my opinion, the Court made the wrong decision in this case by 
improperly dividing the relevant speech, mischaracterizing the speech at hand, and 
creating a faulty test for speech liability. The Court chose to rule on only one portion of 
the relevant speech. While I do not think that the plaintiffs, the Snyders, should have won 
on the basis of the defendant's funeral protest alone, the Court's analysis with only the 
protest in mind was still flawed.  
 The Court in Snyder v. Phelps mischaracterized the nature of case. The Court did 
not fairly deal with the targeted speech before it. This speech attacked an individual 
(targeted him) and thus the fact that much of the speech dealt with issues of public 
concern should not have been dispositive. This mischaracterization, in addition to the 
majority's choice made to not take the relevant internet post into account as part of the 
final verdict, led to an improper balance of speech on issues of public concern against 
speech that could bring rise to an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) 
claim. The Court's opinion appears to allow a speaker to say anything about anyone as 
long as their speech ties back to matters of public concern; while speech on matters of 
public concern deserves the highest First Amendment protection, this heavy-handed form 
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of protection goes too far. Moreover, this simple balancing act is an improper test for 
speech; speech need not be treated as a lump sum. If speech is actionable on a piece by 
piece basis, many of the dangerous scenarios that this decision brings about would be null 
and void. This case turned away from prior court analysis and, in doing so, fundamentally 
changed the relationship between figure status and speech on matters of public concern. 
The change was a bad one. This case too far elevates public concern at the expense of the 
individual target of the speech.  
A. Questions to Ponder 
 Discussing this decision with only the hard facts of the case and a general 
explanation of the possible dangers associated with the decision will not properly impress 
upon the reader the broad implications of this decision. In order to better translate my 
worries about the scope of the decision, I have included several scenarios that are worth 
keeping in mind throughout the rest of the reading.  
 Imagine a scenario in which a group demonstrates outside the place of 
employment of a former soldier. The group is in compliance with local law and follows 
police instruction. The group frequently protests the American military; they are a group 
advocating for an end to the American military and consider all military actions to be 
criminal. Among their signs, they display several calling the former soldier a “war 
criminal” and worse; they inform him that he is the problem in America and that he 
should suffer for it. They go into great detail as to how his personal actions as a soldier 
have damned him. They show up every day for a week and only leave when he takes a 
leave of absence from his office. Although the dominant theme of the protest is on 
matters of public concern, the former soldier is without question the target of this specific 
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protest. As a result of their demonstrations, the former soldier experiences clinical 
depression and lasting health effects stemming from the emotional injury. While the 
former soldier may have been able to collect on an IIED claim before the Snyder ruling, 
after it he would have no legal recourse.  
 While the scenario above is telling as to the scope of this decision, it bears some 
similarities to the facts of Snyder v. Phelps. To take a step away from Snyder itself, 
imagine a scenario where an individual is walking down the street in his or her home 
town. Across the street are several members of an ideological group. They spot the 
individual and, from across the street, begin berating the individual on the basis of some 
particular aspect of his or herself and explaining why they think that aspect is bad for 
America as a whole. This aspect could be religious beliefs (berating a member of the 
WBC for example), ethnicity (the speech leveled at Muslim men after the September 11
th
 
attacks), or even something like weight (in reference to the obesity epidemic in America). 
While this scenario is a bit less clear cut—the individuals might be disturbing the peace, 
they could be stalking the individual, etc.—Snyder v. Phelps protects speech of this 
nature. As long as the speaker keeps the dominant portion of their speech to issues of 
public concern, they are permitted to level this harmful speech at a truly innocent 
bystander.  
 To bring the matter a bit closer to home, think of the recent pro-life protests on 
campus. These protesters worked well within their established First Amendment rights. 
They followed state guidelines, followed university guidelines, and did not disturb the 
peace (at least not to a degree warranting police involvement). However, if they had 
targeted a particular individual walking by and aimed their protest at her, they would still 
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have been protected. If one of the protesters, many of whom are students at the 
University of Maine, had known of a classmate who had an abortion and spoke out about 
it while she was walking by causing her obvious and immediate distress, she, the girl who 
was the object of the speech, would have no recourse.  
 While the Court claimed that their verdict was a narrow one to be matched only to 
the facts of the case at hand, it appears to stretch much farther. Any individual could 
become the target of emotionally damaging speech; while an IIED claim is hard to satisfy 
normally, Snyder v. Phelps takes away any possibility of recourse under this claim when 
matters of public concern are brought into play.  
B. Background of the Westboro Baptist Church 
 The Westboro Baptist Church was founded by Fred Phelps in 1955. The Church 
refers to itself as an “Old School (or Primitive) Baptist Church.” They believe that the 
Bible instructs true believers to judge “righteously” in accordance with God's will 
(Westboro Baptist Church, 2010)
1
.  They believe that God curses those who disobey him 
and that America is cursed (Westboro Baptist Church, 2010). They focus on spreading the 
message of God's hate as derived primarily from Leviticus 20:13 which the WBC 
believes lists rules of human conduct and bears the warning that god will “abhor” those 
who do not follow them. They also believe themselves to be those sent by God to deliver 
his words; this perceived duty is the inspiration for their public protests and displays 
(Westboro Baptist Church, 2010).  
 They spread their caustic message primarily through picketing; they picket both 
institutions and individuals and in recent years have staged at least two demonstrations a 
                                               
1  They claim to adhere to the teachings of the Bible and to try and teach the doctrines of grace 
iterated by John Calvin: the natural condition of total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, 
irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints (Westboro Baptist Church, 2010). 
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week (“Extremism in America,” 2012).  Within the past twenty years, the Westboro 
Baptist church has picketed over six hundred funerals many of which were for military 
personnel. They attempt with their inflammatory displays to spread their belief that God 
hates the U.S. for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly homosexuality within the 
military. The WBC explains that they “bring it home to you specifically, around current 
events, such as the highly publicized funerals of soldiers and others who die by some 
notable calamity (where you appear in mass, for a public/media event, to worship the 
dead and demand of God that He bless you)” in which the “you” represents the American 
public (Westboro Baptist Church, 2010). They believe that funerals are  ideal places for 
their demonstrations as the mind is already dwelling on mortality and the question of 
what might come after death. To demonstrate its beliefs, the church notoriously displays 
signs such as “God Hates Fags” (their signature), “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”, and 
“America is Doomed” which is perhaps the most concise statement of their beliefs 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  
C. Basic Facts of Case 
 On March 3,
 
2006, Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed by an IED in Iraq. 
He was transported back to the United States for a traditional Christian burial at St. 
John’s Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland (Petition for a Writ of Cert., 2010). The 
funeral of Matthew Snyder had been listed (both time and location) in local newspapers 
although Albert Snyder did request a private funeral (Petition for a Writ of Cert., 2010). 
Phelps and his Church put out a press release stating that they were going to “picket the 
funeral of Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder” because “God Almighty killed Lance Cpl. 
Snyder.” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). They staged three protests that day at separate 
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locations, conveying a similar message and displaying predominantly the same signs at 
each demonstration (Salamanca, 2011) On the day of Matt's funeral, the founder of the 
Westboro Baptist Church, Fred Phelps along with six of his followers, all of whom are 
related to him, picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder in 
Westminster, Maryland. They had notified local police in advance of their intention to 
picket. In compliance with local law enforcement instructions, their picketing took place 
on public land approximately 1000 feet from the St. John's Catholic Church where the 
funeral was held. None of the protestors entered church property or the cemetery itself. 
They displayed their signs peaceably throughout the duration of their picketing.   They 
picketed for approximately a half hour before the funeral and ended the picketing as the 
funeral began. (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011) During the protest itself, Phelps and his followers 
sang bible hymns, recited Biblical verses, and abstained from shouting and spoken 
profanity (Salamanca, 2011).  
 Several days later, Westboro Baptist Church member Shirley Phelps-Roper, 
daughter of Fred Phelps, posted an online account titled “The Burden of Marine Lance 
Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist to Help the Inhabitants of 
Maryland Connect the Dots” on the Church’s official website containing pointed 
criticism of the deceased Mathew Snyder, his father Albert Snyder, and his mother, Albert 
Snyder's ex-wife (Salamanca, 2011). The Church colloquially refers to this document as 
the “Epic”. Within the “Epic”, the Church claimed that the Snyders had “taught Matthew 
to defy his creator”, “raised him for the devil”, and “taught him that God was a liar” 
(Salamanca, 2011).   
 Although the funeral procession passed within 300 feet of the picketers, Albert 
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Snyder, father of the deceased, did not see the writing on the signs although he did see the 
tops of the signs. He was not disturbed by the WBC during the funeral itself or before it 
and was not aware during the services that the demonstration was in any way related to 
his son or the funeral. The picketing directly disturbed the funeral proceedings only by 
forcing the funeral procession to be rerouted from the main entrance to a side entrance.  
Snyder initially became aware of the nature of the picketing at the private wake 
immediately following his son’s funeral (Oral Argument, 2010). Several weeks later, 
Albert Snyder found the internet “Epic” after performing an Internet search of his son's 
name (Salamanca, 2011). These actions and facts brought rise to Petitioner Snyder's civil 
suit.  
 
II. Treatment in Lower Courts 
A. Five grounds on which state tort law claims were filed 
  Plaintiff Albert Snyder filed a law suit in the U.S. District Court against Phelps, 
his daughters, and his Church. Snyder alleged five Maryland state tort law claims: 
defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress claim will be the main focus of this paper and the claim most affected by the 
Supreme Court's decision. 
 1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) 
 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is a state tort that has four elements 
that must be met under Maryland law. In order to collect on an IIED claim, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, that the defendant's 
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conduct was extreme or outrageous, and that extreme emotional distress is caused by this 
conduct (IIED, 1992). To recover under the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress one must meet requirements that “are rigorous and difficult to satisfy” as 
established in Harris v. Jones (Harris v. Jones, 1977). A plaintiff must show that the 
conduct caused harm that was extremely severe; “recovery will be meted out sparingly, 
its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing 
themselves” (Harris v. Jones, 1977). A plaintiff must also prove that the conduct of the 
defendant was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community” (Harris v. Jones, 1977).  While this is a difficult tort to satisfy, it 
has been firmly established that speech can be the sole basis for the tort as in Wilkinson v. 
Downtown (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  
  The conduct of the defendants was intentional and reckless as well as extreme and 
outrageous. The defendants intended to harm Plaintiff Snyder and his family (Snyder v. 
Phelps, 2008 p.9). The actions and comments of the defendant have caused severe 
emotional and physical distress to the Plaintiff (Snyder v. Phelps, 2008, p.9). Albert 
Snyder was, according to the record, unable to separate thoughts of his deceased son from 
thought of the Westboro Baptist Church's picketing. He frequently became tearful, angry, 
and sometimes physically ill at the thought of it. Expert witnesses were called in to testify 
that the Church's interference in this personal affair had resulted in a severe depression 






 Defamation is communication that causes those it refers to experience shame or 
ridicule, to be held in contempt by the community, or to suffer a damaged reputation 
(Friedman, 1995). It is governed by state law but restricted by the First Amendment. In 
order to qualify as a defamation claim, the injurious speech must involve a factually 
provable claim (Friedman, 1995). The Constitution protects statements of opinion on 
matters of public concern that are not provably true or false (Friedman, 1995).  
Plaintiff Albert Snyder brought a claim of defamation against the WBC in 
response to numerous statements made by the Church. Plaintiff Snyder never committed 
adultery or taught his son to as the defendants claim. Albert Snyder did not raise his son 
Matt “for the devil” or in any immoral manner (Snyder v. Phelps, 2008 p.6). Albert 
Snyder also did not teach his son to “defy his creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery” 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2008 p. 6). Phelps and his followers made no effort to investigate the 
veracity of their claims; these claims were made intentionally with no regard for the truth 
or falsity of the statements. Moreover, these statements were made with the knowledge 
that they would most likely harm the plaintiff (Snyder v. Phelps, 2008).  These 
defamatory statements were also made publicly and intended to be made public.  
 3) Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
 Intrusion Upon Seclusion is an Invasion of Privacy tort. The tort of Intrusion 
Upon Seclusion occurs when a party intentionally intrudes upon the solitude of another or 
his private affairs or concerns and the invasion would be considered highly offensive to a 
reasonable person (Restatement of the Law, 1977). This form of invasion of privacy does 
not require any publication; it can involve a physical intrusion (as in forcing entry into 
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the person's hotel room against their will) or an unwarranted use of the privacy of another 
(e.g. spying on an individual and seeing that which they would have hidden).  
 The claim of intrusion upon seclusion was applied here because the defendants 
intentionally infringed upon the solitude and seclusion of the plaintiff and his family. 
Phelps also intruded upon the private affairs and concerns of the plaintiff. The personal 
affairs of Albert Snyder are not matters of public concern nor was the private funeral of 
Matthew Snyder (Snyder v. Phelps, 2008). This intrusion would be deemed extremely 
offensive to any reasonable person (Snyder v. Phelps, 2008).   
 4) Publicity given to private life 
 A person who publicizes a matter involving the private life of another is subject to 
liability for invasion of privacy under Maryland law if the matter they have publicized is 
a topic that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and is not a subject of 
legitimate concern to the public (Restatement of the Law, 1977). The defendant’s 
publicity given to private life in this case constitutes an invasion of privacy. The 
statements of the defendant would be highly offensive to any reasonable person and the 
actions and statements of the defendant were “not consistent with any legitimate concern 
to the public” (12, 8). The continued use of the website www.godhatesfags.com 
concerning the plaintiff is also outrageous and continues to publicize the private life of 
Snyder and his ex-wife (12.9).  
 5) Civil Conspiracy 
 A Civil Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more individuals to complete 
through their cooperation something unlawful or to complete a purpose that is lawful 
through unlawful means. This tort renders each participant in the conspiracy responsible 
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as a joint tortfeasor for all damages associated with the wrong regardless as to each 
participant’s degree of direct involvement (Restatement of the Law, 1977).  
 The individual defendants agreed to travel from Kansas to Maryland with the 
express purpose of protesting Matt’s funeral. Once there, they colluded to invade the 
privacy of and defame the plaintiff (12, 10). The individual defendants furthered their 
tortious acts by posting similarly invasive and defamatory content on their website (12. 
10). These acts were, in accordance with the four torts previously discussed, unlawful and 
continue to be so. 
 
B. Lower Courts 
 1) District Court 
 The United States District Court awarded the Westboro Baptist Church summary 
judgment on Snyder's claims of defamation and publicity given to private life; summary 
judgment is the term used for an instance of a court dismissing claims before going to 
trial. According to the District Court, the claim of defamation was unsatisfied because the 
only possibly defamatory speech was part of the “Epic” which was nothing more than 
Ms. Phelps-Roper’s religious opinion and thus would not realistically expose the 
Snyder’s to any bias from other individuals, an element of defamation claims that the 
District Court seemed to set up as the main test for defamation in this case. The claim of 
publicity given to private life was not met because the Defendant had not published any 
information that had initially been private. There were no specifics of the Snyder’s lives 
other than their full names that were publicized by the Phelps (Salamanca, 2011).  
 A trial was thus held on the remaining three tort claims. On the remaining three 
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claims from the original grounds of the diversity petition (IIED, Intrusion upon 
Seclusion, and Civil Conspiracy), the jury found the Westboro Baptist Church liable for 
$10.9 million total in damages ($2.9 million in compensatory and $8 million punitive 
damages) (Salamanca, 2011). The Westboro Baptist Church challenged this verdict as 
“grossly excessive” and sought judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the first 
Amendment fully protected its speech (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p. 5). The District Court 
reduced the punitive damages awarded but otherwise left the rest of the verdict intact. 
Westboro moved for summary judgment contending that the First Amendment insulated 
the Church’s speech from tort liability. 
 2) Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the original verdict on 
all claims, finding that the Westboro Baptist Church's statements were entitled to First 
Amendment protection because its statements dealt with matters of public concern, were 
not provably false, and were expressed solely through “hyperbolic rhetoric and figurative 
expression” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p. 4). The decision was unanimous, although Judge 
Shedd did differentiate himself from the majority opinion. Snyder, according to the 
concurrence of the Court of Appeals opinion by Judge Shedd, had simply failed to 
provide sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict on any of his tort claims 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). 
C.  Public Opinion 
 The judicial system in America is in place in part to protect individuals from the 
whim of the majority. This nation has a strong precedent of protecting the lawful views 
and actions of individuals even when they are unpopular or offensive to the majority. 
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However, there is certainly a real strain placed on judges when a case does fly in face of 
public opinion.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. perhaps best stated the impact of cases 
that catch the public eye; “hard cases...are apt to introduce bad law.” Great cases, like 
hard cases, also make bad law for “great cases are called great, not by reason of their real 
importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate 
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feeling and distorts the judgment” 
(Salamanca, 2011). Snyder v. Phelps was a hard case but it did not make bad law in the 
sense Holmes speaks of; there is an obvious and immediate interest in the compelling 
humanitarian claim Albert Snyder, the grieving father, presented. The public had a strong 
interest in seeing the Albert Snyder and the memory of his son vindicated. To the benefit 
of free speech, the Court did not make an error based on distorted judgment. The Court 
deserves credit in this case for adhering to law rather than “constructing an artificial 
category to sustain an otherwise desirable result” (Salamanca, 2011).  While the Court 
did err in their final analysis, their error was not one of punishing a group for offensive 
speech. 
 The basic circumstances of this case play on the emotions: a grieving father, a son 
that gave his life for the country, and a religious group that took advantage of that 
horrible situation in order to express their outrageous message (Salamanca, 2011). While 
specific restrictions will be explored later, it is important here to note that broad 
protection is given to certain types of speech to ensure that the courts do not become 
“inadvertent censors” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.6).  Attorney Sean E. Summers, 
representing Petitioner Albert Snyder, summed up the emotional response to the law in 
oral argument with “I would hope that the First Amendment wasn't enacted to allow 
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people to disrupt and harass people at someone else's private funeral” (Oral Argument, 
2010 p.23).  
III. Supreme Court Proceedings 
A. Petition for Cert. and Brief in Opposition 
 1) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
 Petitioner Snyder brought three main questions before the Court. The first was 
whether Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell could apply to a private person versus another 
private person concerning a private matter (Petition for a Writ of Cert., 2010). This 
question will hold the greatest relevance to the Supreme Court's analysis but 
unfortunately will not receive a clear answer. The second was whether the First 
Amendment freedom of speech tenet can trump the First Amendment Freedom of religion 
and peaceful assembly (Petition for a Writ of Cert., 2010)? This question was not 
examined by the Court; in order to answer this question, the Court would need to 
establish some sort of hierarchy to protected First Amendment freedom. The third, was 
whether an individual attending a family member's funeral would constitute a captive 
audience (Petition for a Writ of Cert., 2010)?  
 Snyder's main error was specifying in his petition for certiorari that his “claims 
arose out of Phelps’s intentional acts at Snyder's son's funeral” to the exclusion of the 
Internet “Epic” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p. 3). As discussed earlier in this paper, Phelps 
and his followers did not actually disturb the Snyders during the funeral. Moreover, they 
did not picket in the area during the actual funeral proceedings. The most obviously 
targeted, defamatory, and emotional injurious speech on the Phelps’ part occurred later in 
the form of an Internet “Epic” that Snyder had failed to mention within his petition for 
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certiorari (Sacks, 2011). Based on the claims brought up in this petition for certiorari, the 
Court ruled that it did not have the “Epic” before it (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  Thus the 
Court decided this case on the basis of Westboro’s picketing alone, which consisted 
primarily of their less targeted speech.  
2) Respondent Brief in Opposition 
 The Phelps' brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari mainly deals with the 
large claim that the Petitioner fails to present an issue worthy of the Court's 
consideration. Because the case deals with public rather than private matters which the 
Court has already established are protected, the case is not worthy of consideration (Brief 
in Opposition, 2010). It also does not, as Petitioners claim, deal with the question of a 
Captive Audience due to the distance of the picketers from the funeral and the lack of 
disruption caused (Brief in Opposition, 2010). Moreover, there is no split in the circuits 
relevant to the case at hand because the case does not directly deal with the 
Constitutionality of laws restricting funeral picketing (Brief in Opposition, 2010). The 
only law restricting funeral picketing relevant to this case was put in place in response to 
the picketing.  
B. Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
An eight-member majority ruled that the First Amendment precludes tort liability 
in this instance because the comments of the Westboro Baptist Church were on matters of 
public concern, not provably false, and expressed only through hyperbolic rhetoric 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). Moreover, the Church’s speech was not motivated by any 
private grudge against the Snyders and the protest occurred on public land rather than 
private property (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). While the Court looked at several elements of 
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this case, this paper will focus on their analysis relevant to the IIED Claim. 
 The opening sentence written by Justice Roberts for the majority is really quite 
misleading. He states that a jury had held the Westboro Baptist Church liable for 
picketing near a soldier’s funeral; in reality, the jury had held the Westboro Baptist 
Church liable for their inflammatory speech and the contents of the Internet “Epic”2. 
Although the Court looked at only a narrow view of the facts, the question before them 
was quite broad. Does the First Amendment shield members of the Church from tort 
liability for IIED? The answer to this question, according to the majority turned largely 
on the content of the speech, namely, whether the speech at issue was of public or private 
concern (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  
 1) Public or Private Concern 
 The Court attributed the signs displayed during the protest to the category of 
speech on issues of public concern. Speech on public concern is “the essence of self-
government” and as such carries broad protection (Salamanca, 2011). While the 
boundaries of what is and is not a matter of public concern are not well defined and there 
is not a clear test, it is equivalent to the most protected form of speech within this nation. 
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern in the community or when it is a 
subject of legitimate news interest (Salamanca, 2011). In order to determine when 
something is public or private speech, one needs to look at the “content, form, and 
context” as “revealed by the whole record” (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 1985).  
                                               
2  While this may seem like a miniscule distinction, the lower courts dealt not with the act of 
picketing, but with the speech utilized during the picketing in connection with the speech employed within 
the “Epic”.  
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  a. Connick v. Myers 
 Myers, an assistant District Attorney for New Orleans, was informed by her boss 
District Attorney Connick that she might be transferred. Myers put a questionnaire into 
circulation regarding her possible transfer; the District Attorney terminated her 
employment upon learning of the questionnaire (Connick v. Myers, 1983). The issue at 
hand was whether the termination of Ms. Myers, the cause of action, was in violation of 
her First Amendment rights. The answer to this question rested on whether or not the 
questionnaire was a matter of public concern. Although one of Myers' questions was 
directly related to matters of public concern, the overall relation of her protest to public 
concern was extremely limited (Connick v. Myers, 1983). Thus, the Court ruled in favor 
of Connick calling the termination of Myers constitutional.  
 Whether or not the First Amendment prohibits holding the WBC liable in this case 
is, according to the Court, largely dependent on whether that speech is of public or 
private concern. Not all speech is of equal importance; when speech is of private 
significance only, there are far less rigorous First Amendment protections of it. The Court 
looked to Connick v. Meyers when balancing the importance of free speech against the 
need to protect individuals from unwarranted emotional injury; “speech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and as such is 
entitled to special protection (Connick v. Myers, 1983. p. 145). While the particulars of 
the Westboro Baptist Church's speech may have been extreme and offensive, much of 
their speech deals with matters of public concern.  
 Connick v. Myers is also relevant to Snyder v. Phelps because it puts a limit, a 
small one, on how far protections of matters of public concern should extend. Myers lost 
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her suit because the dominant thrust of her speech dealt with issues of private concern 
rather than public (Connick v. Myers, 1983). While the Westboro Baptist Church may 
have made comments dealing only with private concern (specific signs seeming to 
denounce Matt Snyder in particular), the overall thrust of their message did deal with 
matters of public concern.  
  b. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell 
 Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell was a 1988 Supreme Court case. Petitioners 
Hustler Magazine and Flynt Publications had run a parody of an advertisement that 
portrayed the fundamentalist Protestant minister Jerry Falwell and his mother as immoral 
drunks and asserted that Falwell was a hypocrite who only preached when intoxicated 
although this caricature of Falwell was not the point of the ad (Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 1988). Falwell brought suit against Hustler Magazine seeking to recover 
damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and IIED. The question before the Supreme Court 
was whether public figures and officials can recover for the tort of IIED as delivered 
through publications. The Supreme Court held that public figures and public officials 
couldn’t recover for damages from IIED by publication without also proving that the 
publication in addition included a false statement of fact made with “actual malice” 
(Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 1988)
3
.  
 Although the state does have an interest in protecting public figures from IIED, 
this interest is not great enough to override the First Amendment protections for free 
speech. In order for public debate to be free, citizens must have some freedom in the 
method of their discourse on public figures and officials (Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
                                               
3 “Actual malice” as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan. A statement made with “actual malice” 
must be made with knowledge that the statement was false or with a reckless disregard as to whether it was 
true or false.  
 19 
 
Falwell, 1988). While the ad run was certainly “outrageous” it was, as pointed out by the 
appellate court, reasonably believable and thus the original jury decision in favor of the 
Snyders was overly influenced by the outrageous content of the political speech (Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 1988). The case was decided unanimously
4
. Hustler was 
pivotal in placing a limit on when individuals can bring claims against speakers on the 
basis of their harmful speech. The limit appeared to only apply to public figures. The 
verdict of the Court in Snyder v. Phelps went much farther.  
  The real problem facing the Snyders was that the only other case the plaintiffs 
had that dealt with IIED from the Supreme Court is Hustler v. Falwell. Hustler v. Falwell 
clearly dealt with a public figure rather than a private one; however, the states and the 
Federal Courts have since interpreted Hustler v. Falwell as not applying to private figures 
(Oral Argument, 2010). Hustler establishes the rule that when matters of speech concern 
only private figures, First Amendment protections for the speaker are less rigorous 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). The Supreme Court had not directly held, in Hustler or any 
subsequent case, on what the law should mean in this same scenario if a private figure is 
the target of the speech. The Court did not directly address the issue here although the 
scenario at play in Snyder v. Phelps is markedly similar to that in Hustler Magazine Inc. 
v. Falwell with the noted exception that Snyder does not deal with a public official or 
figure.  
 c. San Diego v. Roe 
 San Diego v. Roe tests the boundaries of public concern. A police officer, hereafter 
identified as John Roe, was terminated by his employer, the city of San Diego, for 
producing and selling videos of himself engaging in sexually explicit behavior (San 
                                               
4  This was an 8-0 decision as Justice Kennedy had recused himself from the case. 
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Diego v. Roe, 2004). The question before the Court was whether the termination of 
Officer Roe violated his First Amendment Rights. The Court held that the termination 
was valid and that Roe's rights had not been infringed. His speech was “detrimental to the 
missions and functions of the employer” and it was of no concern to the community (San 
Diego v. Roe, 2004)
5
. While most of the case dealt merely with internal workplace 
grievances, this strange case did help to clarify the boundaries of what constitute matters 
of public concern. An individual does not have absolute freedom of speech and cannot 
expect protection under the guise of a matter of public concern in instances where that 
speech does not actually add to the public debate.  
 The boundaries of what constitutes speech regarding matters of public concern are 
poorly defined. The Court has previously said that speech is of public concern when it 
can be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concerns of 
the community” (Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 1988). It must be “a subject of 
general interest and of value and concern to the public” (San Diego v. Roe, 2004). This is 
of course, still a fairly broad categorization. San Diego v. Roe only proves that one cannot 
later claim that protecting the speech was of interest to the general public when the 
speech itself was not clearly related to public issues
6
. In Snyder, the content of the protest 
clearly relates to public concern about society's tacit acceptance of homosexuality within 
the military, the political and moral conduct of America, and the subsequent fate the 
Westboro Baptist Church believes America will face.  
                                               
5 Officer Roe's uniform was displayed in several of his explicit videos and he was selling his old 
police uniforms under the same online alias (San Diego v. Roe, 2004).  
6 The Court of Appeals, whose decision the Supreme Court reversed in San Diego v. Roe, had 
concluded that Officer Roe's speech was on matters of public concern (despite his lack of political or social 
commentary) and made no attempt to explain the perceived matter of public concern in this particular 
instance (San Diego v. Roe, 2004).  
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  d. Further Questions Raised 
 An interesting question does arise in relation to speech on public concern. While 
there are very broad ideas as to what constitutes a matter of public concern, there is less 
established regulation as to how speech becomes public. Snyder v. Phelps brings up the 
question of whether or not making any aspect of life known to the public is enough to 
enable that aspect to become the subject of public debate (Oral Argument, 2010). In this 
instance Albert Snyder was vocal about his sorrow over his son's death and his 
displeasure with current American foreign affairs. The Westboro Baptist Church claimed 
that this alone was enough to justify their protests. This then raises a further issue in that, 
under the Westboro Baptist Church's definition, every bereaved family member who 
provides information to a local newspaper for an obituary runs the risk of their deceased 
loved one being treated as a vehicle for public speech (Oral Argument, 2010). The WBC 
objects to this claim although, on its face, it appears to fit the logic the church employs. 
The Church claims that, in order to avoid tort liability, the speech in question must not be 
out of the blue, it must not be “up close” or confrontational, and the family member of 
the deceased must have a high level of involvement in the public eye (Oral Argument, 
2010 p.37).  
2) Content, Form, and Context 
  a. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders 
 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, a 1985 case, was a case that 
covered much ground. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., a credit-reporting agency, erroneously 
reported to five of its subscribers that contractor Greenmoss Builders had filed for 
bankruptcy. Dun & Bradstreet would not release information about the subscribers to 
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Greenmoss Builders, although it did issue a redaction of the bankruptcy claim (Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 1974). Greenmoss Builders again requested 
information about the specific subscribers, in order to send their own mailing, and were 
again denied. Greenmoss Builders brought a defamation action against Dun & Bradstreet. 
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether or not the Gertz rule that the 
states could not impose punitive damages in defamation cases without a showing of 




 Five of the Justices agreed that the prior rule should not apply when the 
defamatory statements do not deal with matters of public concern. This distinction was 
agreed upon using the rationale that liability should be determined by looking at the 
whole record of each individual case. Dun established that the Court must examine 
independently the “content, form, and context” of free speech cases.  To put it more 
simply, Dun requires the court to evaluate for each individual case all aspects of the 
speech especially what was said, how it was said, and where it was said. While this case 
deals directly with defamation, it brought about the idea that all parts of the record for a 
case dealing with free speech must be examined.  
  b. Context: Funeral 
 As Mr. Summers had argued during oral argument, if context ever matters, it 
should regarding funerals (Oral Argument, 2010). Although this certainly appeals to the 
public’s general concept of morality, it does not mesh with the laws of this nation. While 
                                               
7 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. established the standard of First Amendment Protection against 
defamation suits. It allowed states to make their own rules to determine liability of defamatory statements 
made about private individuals. It also established that if the state standard is lower than actual malice, only 
actual damages may be awarded (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 1974).  
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it is certainly true that the Westboro Baptist Church could have chosen to stage their 
protest at countless other more relevant locations (the Pentagon or any of the more than 
5,600 military recruiting stations around the country, for example), they are under no 
obligation to directly match the content of the protest to the location at which it is staged 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). As Justice Scalia sought to establish in oral argument, a friendly 
protest within a certain distance of a funeral is not, at least not to the petitioners, the same 
as a protest within a certain distance of a funeral that defames a corpse (Oral Argument, 
2010). It was the emotionally distressing nature of the protest that brought rise to the 
claim rather than the mere fact of the demonstration. Moreover, the claim for intrusion 
upon seclusion simply because this protest disrupted a funeral is itself a deceptive claim.  
Thus, the real complaint was not intrusion based on the location and time of the protest 
but instead a content-based objection on the personal attacks (Oral Argument, 2010). 
While context may matter, this case was concerned primarily with content.  
  c. Frisby v. Schultz 
 Sandra Schultz, an individual vehemently opposed to abortion, gathered a group 
of individuals together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed 
abortions. The city of Brookfield, Wisconsin in response passed an ordinance that 
prohibited all picketing outside of residential homes (Frisby v. Schultz, 1988). The 
ordinance was put in place “for the protection and preservation of the home” (Frisby v. 
Schultz, 1988). The question that made its way to the Supreme Court was whether or not 
an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of residential homes violates the First 
Amendment. The Court ruled with a vote of 6-3 that it does not. The area of the 
picketing, a public street, does constitute a traditional public forum, however that alone 
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does not guarantee protection. As long as a ban satisfies strict scrutiny, it can remain. In 
this case, the ban was content neutral, “leaves open alternative channels”, and serves a 
legitimate government interest (Frisby v. Schultz, 1988).  
 The Court did point out that even protected speech is not equally permissible in 
all places at all times. Even protected speech can be subject to “reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  The Westboro Baptist Church's choice of 
where and when to picket is subject to some regulation. In response to this case, 
Maryland has since enacted a law that restricts funeral picketing similar in essence to the 
law in question in Frisby v. Schultz. The Maryland law is not broad enough to have made 
a difference in this case had it been enacted pre- Snyder v. Phelps, but it does indicate a 
willingness on the part of the states to take action. These laws offer some protection for 
the individuals who find themselves the target of public displays. The majority in Snyder 
v. Phelps did not deny that the Phelps did harm to the Snyders; while the majority offers 
no recompense to the Snyders in this case, they do indicate that state laws could help to 
prevent against this sort of harm in the future. 
  d. Final Content and Context Analysis 
 The specific context of this speech gives rise to much of the public controversy in 
this case.  While it is certainly inappropriate, the context of the Church's speech does not 
transform the speech. Phelps and his followers issued their venomous speech on public 
land next to a public street; they did not infringe on the private funeral or enter in any 
way the grounds of the church. The speech was not “contrived to insinuate a personal 
attack on Snyder”; the Westboro Baptist Church has been preaching on the same topic for 
years, and there is no real question as to whether the picketing accurately represented 
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their honestly held beliefs (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). The specific content of this message 
reasserts its importance; while speech of mere private significance offers “no threat to 
public debate… [And] no interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas” (Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 1985). Speech on public issues is pivotal to 
public debate. The importance of free speech on public issues has been reaffirmed on 
numerous occasions. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan spoke of the “national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” (New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964)
8
. Garrison v. Louisiana went even farther defining 
speech on public issues as the “essence of self-government” (Garrison v. Louisiana, 
1964)
9
. The signs that the church displayed spoke to numerous issues of public concern 
including homosexuality in the military, the political conduct of the United States, and 
the moral conduct of the United States and its citizens (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). While 
several of the signs can be viewed as relating to a particular individual, the majority of 
the Courtbelieves that this does not change the fact that the dominant themes of the 
protest were public in nature. 
3) Outrageous Speech 
 In order to discuss the outrageous nature of the WBC’s speech, the Court looked 
to Rankin v. McPherson. Rankin, a data-entry employee in a constable's office, remarked 
in passing to another employee after hearing of a death threat against the president that  
                                               
8 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan dealt with an ad which had accused Alabama police of arresting Martin 
Luther King Jr. merely in an effort to limit his influence. Under Alabama law, city commissioner Sullivan 
could collect for libel as he claimed to be personally defamed. This case established that all statements said 
about public officials are permissible unless they are made with the knowledge that they are false (New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964).  
9 Garrison v. Louisiana explored how far the N.Y.  Times v. Sullivan ruling could be extended. 
Garrison, a Lousiania D.A. Criticized the work and work ethic of local judges. He was sued under 
Louisiana law which required no proof of ill will in concurrence with factually inaccurate speech about 
public officials. Garrison won the case and it was decided that the ruling from N.Y. Times v. Sullivan limits 




she hoped the individual did “get him” (Rankin v. McPherson, 1987)10. Her statement 
was made as part of a private conversation within a room not available to the public. She 
was fired by the Constable because of this statement. Rankin alleged that her termination 
was in violation of her First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court agreed as her 
statement was part of a larger conversation dealing with the President's policy, a clear 
matter of public concern (Rankin v. McPherson, 1987). Moreover, her statement was not 
tantamount to a threat on the President's life, speech that could be criminalized, but 
merely her opinion of an extremist action. More importantly, the extreme nature of this 
statement does not, according to the McPherson court, change the nature of the speech 
away from matters of public concern (Rankin v. McPherson, 1987). 
  Much of the controversy surrounding Snyder lies not in the actual legality, but 
instead in the offense taken by the public to the Church's message. The Westboro Baptist 
Church is inescapably controversial and emphasizes the controversial nature of their 
beliefs so as to garner more attention. Although it is not surprising that the public finds 
this offensive, legally it should be irrelevant. In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court had 
stated that the “inappropriate or controversial character” of a statement is “irrelevant to 
the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern” (Rankin v. McPherson, 
1987). Although this case is certainly controversial, dealing with a message of religious 
hate, this controversial character and the setting it was held in are not enough to 
contradict the nature of the speech itself. As established, this speech clearly relates to 
                                               
10 Rankin was not a peace officer and her opinions cannot fairly be attributed to the Constable's 
office in the same way that a statement made by an officer within his or her official capacity might. 
Rankin's job title heavily affectss this decision in that it renders complaints about possible harm done to the 
office by her comments moot (Rankin v. McPherson, 1987).  
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public concern on several dimensions. 
 4) IIED Dismissal 
 The jury verdict imposing tort liability on the Westboro Baptist Church for IIED 
must be set aside; while the speech was certainly offensive, it did not, according to the 
Court, unfairly target the Snyders and it dealt predominantly with matters of public 
concern. As it stands, it appears that the jury is merely punishing the Church for its views 
on matters of public concern when those views themselves should not be subject to 
regulation (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). To stifle the voice of the WBC here would, according 
to the majority's analysis, be harmful to public debate. The Court also dismissed the 
Intrusion Upon Seclusion claim and the Civil Conspiracy claim. 
C. Concurrence 
 Justice Breyer joins in the opinion of the majority although he does have a 
different interpretation of the case. Justice Breyer distinguishes his concurring opinion 
from that of the majority through his method of analyzing how picketing on matters of 
public concern should be judged. While the majority appeared to stop their analysis with 
the question of whether or not the actionable speech was on matters of public concern, 
Justice Breyer insists that there should be more to the debate than merely that one 
question. It has been established in Frisby v. Schultz that a State can regulate picketing on 
matters of public concern. It has also been recognized that there is no First Amendment 
protection for unlawful conduct even if the conduct was committed in order to further a 
message relating to issues of public concern (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011).  
 Justice Breyer appears to call for a balancing act between the majority opinion 
and Justice Alito’s dissent. While the question of whether or not the speech is of public 
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concern is important, it should be tempered by an interest in protecting the right of the 
States' to protect their citizens from extreme emotional harm. Justice Breyer points out 
that because the funeral itself was not disrupted and the emotional harm was rendered 
after the fact, it is not extreme enough to warrant further investigation (Snyder v. Phelps, 
2011). Perhaps the most important difference to note between the majority opinion and 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence is that Justice Breyer took pains to point out that while the 
Court’s decision renders First Amendment protection for Westboro in this instance, this 
decision “holds no more” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). This statement seems to imply that, 
IIED claims might still hold water in cases involving matters of public concern if the 
facts of the case were different. If, for example, the facts of the case were the same with 
the sole exception of the WBC having disrupted the funeral proceedings (perhaps with 
signs clearly visible throughout the duration of the funeral), Justice Breyer may have 
been writing another dissenting opinion rather than a concurrence.  
 Justice Breyer also pointed out that this decision says nothing about how Internet 
postings should be dealt with and does not examine the effect of television broadcasts 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). While this hardly packs the same punch as footnote 1 in the 
majority opinion, it does have a very important implication. By stressing that this 
decision should not hold sway over television broadcasts and Internet postings, Justice 
Breyer appears to imply that this type of speech may need to be judged differently.  
D. Dissent 
 Justice Alito stood alone in dissent of the majority opinion. Alito favors a more 
restricted concept of free speech; the national commitment to free speech, according to 
Justice Alito, “is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case” 
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(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p. 1). Justice Alito stresses that the Church, like anyone wishing 
to air an opinion, has “almost limitless opportunities to express their views” from writing 
books, to circulating petitions, to peaceably protesting in numerous settings (Snyder v. 
Phelps, 2011 p. 2)
11
.  However, these protections for free speech do not apply when the 
very narrow tort of IIED is brought forth in an instance where the speech in question 
makes no real contribution to public debate. A society in which “public issues can be 
openly and vigorously debated” does not require allowances to be made for “the 
brutalization of innocent victims” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.14).  
 Alito openly criticized what he perceived to be the three main reasons the 
majority had found the Westboro Baptist Church’s speech to be protected under the First 
Amendment. The first reason, that the speech was dominantly on public issues, he simply 
labeled as an inaccurate portrayal. According to Justice Alito the First Amendment does 
and should allow recovery for “defamatory statements that are interspersed with 
nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.10). 
Regarding the lack of a private grudge against the Snyders on the part of the Westboro 
Baptist Church, whether or not the Church hates the Snyders or merely America as a 
whole does nothing to “soften the sting of their attack” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.10). 
Regarding the location of the protest on public property, the location, although it would 
certainly weaken a claim of IIED, does not preclude IIED liability (Snyder v. Phelps, 
2011).  
 Alito took offense to the way that the majority divided the Church's message. The 
majority dismissed the “Epic” because it was not properly brought before them within the 
                                               
11 The existence of alternative opportunities for speech is a question normally asked only for content-
neutral expressions, according to Frisbee. This case deals with content-based expressions. Justice Alito 
appears to be applying the Frisbee analysis somewhat indiscriminately.  
 30 
 
cert petition. Alito believes that the “Epic” should not have been dismissed because it was 
merely a relevant piece of evidence within the record. The Court, according to Alito, does 
not require that every factual piece of information be included within the Petition for cert. 
Under this interpretation, the “Epic” would be squarely before the Court. While the 
“Epic”   
was posted later and was as such not a direct component of the initial protesting, it still 
stood on the record as part of the Church’s message. It also made far more direct 
references to the Snyders which, for Alito, took this speech out of the realm of public 
concern (Shulman, 2011). Is it really logical to immunize actionable speech simply 
because it is interspersed with protected speech? 
E. Possible Legislative Solutions in light of Supreme Court Decision 
 1) Current State Laws 
 In response to the WBC's picketing of Matthew Snyder's funeral, the state of 
Maryland enacted a law that prohibits picketing of all kinds within 500 feet of a funeral 
(Rutledge, 2008)
12
. This law was not in place at the time of the Church's protest and, 
interestingly, would not have actually prevented the Church from picketing. Over forty 
states have enacted content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions limiting picketing 
or demonstrations within some “specified distance from funeral services, processions, or 
cemeteries” (Brownstein & Amar, 2011).  The laws differ only in the process they require 
in order to picket and the distance that picketers must stay away (Rutledge, 2008). The 
Constitutionality of these laws has not yet been dealt with. While dealing with this 
question would have been difficult if not inappropriate within Snyder v. Phelps, perhaps 
                                               
12 The distance was originally 100 feet but, on April 11th was unanimously voted to be raised to the 
new 500 ft. limit (Rutledge, 2008).  
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the Court should have chosen to hear a case dealing with the Constitutionality of laws 
restricting picketing near funerals as Snyder v. Phelps would have fallen under the 
umbrella of that topic (Brownstein & Amar, 2011).  
 2) Is more needed?  
 As Justice Ginsburg mentioned in Oral Argument, nothing out of place with the 
Maryland statute occurred in Snyder v. Phelps (Oral Argument, 2010). Justice Alito had 
asked if Mr. Summers believed that the Maryland legislature had intended to occupy the 
field of regulations of events that occur at funerals. Considering that they had not outright 
restricted protests or demonstrations occurring at funerals, it seems unlikely. Even the 
strictest restrictions do not go so far as to completely ban this sort of protest. The issue at 
hand regardless as to what level of government is imposing this sort of regulation is that 
the restriction be reasonable. Is it reasonable to try and enact a ban on funeral picketing 
entirely? One can interpret the right to mourn as a legitimate interest in need of 
protection, but the protection cannot be so extreme as to thwart the higher interest in 
protecting speech. While these small restrictions on funeral picketing (i.e. a 500 ft. 
minimum distance away) may prove to be constitutionally viable
13
, would a larger 
restriction also pass the test of Constitutionality? At what point is it unreasonable to 
restrict picketing? While 300 feet may not protect funeral goers who must drive by the 
picketers, 1000 feet may be an excessive restriction. Some similar discussions have 
already been had in Courts; for example, the courts have already decided that a 300 foot 
restriction regarding picketing of an abortion clinic is too far. Although this may provide 
some blueprint for courts in the future, it is important to note that these emotionally 
                                               
13  The ongoing Phelps-Roper v. Nixon case questions the Constitutionality of a Missouri law which 




charged places may require special and distinct considerations even in comparison to one 
another.  
 Restrictions on speech must be content neutral. The question here is would a ban 
on funeral protests be content neutral in practice? As Ms. Phelps-Roper pointed out, there 
was another group demonstrating outside the gates of the church; the other demonstrating 
group was holding up American flags and voicing a message of God's love for America 
(Oral Argument, 2010). As Ms. Phelps-Roper accurately stated the real reason for this 
desire for a ban on demonstrations at or around funerals is not itself a content-neutral 
desire. The Snyders did not claim that those supporting America outside the church were 
intruding because they quite simply were not in an unwelcome way.  Within oral 
argument, Justice Ginsburg questioned why specifically the First Amendment should 
“tolerate exploiting this bereaved family when you have so many other forums for getting 
across your message?” (Oral Argument, 2010, p. 30). Ms. Phelps-Roper responded by 
stating that the “principles of law...are without regard to viewpoint” in respect to its 
limitations (Oral Argument, 2010 p.30). While there are certainly content-neutral 
restrictions on when and where one can protest, there is no restriction based upon the 
clearly content based idea of “exploiting the bereavement”— even though that 
exploitation could easily cause emotional distress— nor is there even a principle of law 
that falls under that title. 
 
IV. What does this decision really mean? 
 At face value, this case could be seen as little more than the application of settled 
doctrine to difficult facts. The Court has repeatedly recognized that the Constitution 
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protects discourse on matters of public concern even when the speech is “disagreeable”, 
“outrageous”, “misguided”, or “stirs people to anger” (Salamanca, 2011). There is little 
argument within the courts over the need to protect speech even when that speech flies in 
the face of public opinion. However, the method by which the Court read the facts of the 
case and the questions they asked in order to determine whether or not the Westboro 
Baptist Church's speech should be protected were unexpected to say the least.  
A) How narrow was this decision? 
 The Court directly states within the majority opinion that the holding in this case 
is a narrow one (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). They cite the maxim put down in Florida Star. 
v. B.J.F. “the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between 
First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep 
no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 
p.14). While a narrow holding in accordance with the judicial restraint advocated in 
Florida Star v B.J.F may have been what the Court intended, in practice the verdict of 
Snyder v. Phelps appears to play a very different role. While the decision was tailored to 
the narrow facts of the case, it was created by invoking a vast change to the order of 
questions that must be asked to determine if speech receives First Amendment protection. 

















Figure 1.2 (Post Snyder v. Phelps) 
 
 While these two cases deal with slightly different issues in that Snyder v. Phelps 
deals primarily with matters of public concern while Hustler deals with how speech on a 
public figure should be treated, these two cases are closely related. The Hustler case has 
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been treated since its beginnings as a sort of blueprint for First Amendment free speech 
protection in the context of the IIED tort. Hustler directly established that speech that 
targets public figures and officials should be protected as long as it is not factually 
inaccurate or excessively outrageous (Connick v. Myers, 1983). While it is not stated 
within the case, the courts interpreted the case to mean that private figures should be 
treated differently. While speech about public figures requires little to be protected, 
speech about private figures was interpreted to require a much more difficult hoop to 
jump through. 
 Snyder v. Phelps seems to differ from Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell in that it 
shifts the focus to the status of the speech at issue rather than the figure status. Although 
the Court referenced Hustler numerous times, the ruling in Snyder seems to have no 
bearing on it.  If one was to apply the seemingly important public versus private figure 
status differentiation present in Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell to the facts of Snyder v. 
Phelps, it might have supported a holding against the church as Matt Snyder was, to a 
common sense analysis, a private citizen rather than a public figure although the Court's 
decision seems to indicate otherwise (Salamanca, 2011). No member of the majority 
argued that the Snyders were public figures, yet they found this speech against them 
permissible. Either the different treatment awarded on the basis of status in Hustler has 
been greatly weakened by the Court or America has been operating for years on a 
misreading of the Courts intentions in Hustler.  
 B) Similarities to the 4
th
 Circuit Ruling 
 Justice Kagan brought up an interesting point in oral argument concerning Hustler 
v. Falwell. Hustler puts forth the idea that “'outrageousness' in the area of political and 
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social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to 
impose liability on the basis of the juror's tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their 
dislike of a particular expression” (Oral Argument, 2010, p. 22). That problem of 
subjectivity still stands if the logic is applied to private figures instead of public.  The 4
th
 
Circuit seemed to be exploring this same idea to worrisome ends. While the majority did 
not display similar analysis, they also did not dismiss the analysis of the 4
th
 Circuit. Thus, 
the 4
th
 Circuit's analysis, though troublesome, may remain a viable method for ruling on 
these cases.   
 The 4th Circuit observed that some of the signs displayed during the protest could 
be construed as referring personally to Matthew Snyder. Despite this observation, the 4th 
Circuit labeled the protest as protected speech. While in theory this speech would have 
been actionable, the 4th Circuit claimed, “no reasonable reader would interpret the signs 
as anything but hyperbolic rhetoric” (Shulman, 2011)14.  This interpretation seems 
patently flawed. If this is accepted, then a victim of personally abusive speech has no 
legal remedy. The 4
th
 Circuit thus directly applied the logic utilized in Hustler Magazine 
Inc. v. Falwell (in relation to public figures) to private individuals. While this is a logical, 
albeit unfortunate for the public figure, necessity in Hustler to bolster public debate, it 
serves no such purpose here. Under this strange logic, a speech-based claim of emotional 
injury would only be acceptable if the defendant had been objectively reporting facts.  
 One might argue that the 4th Circuit attempted to extend free speech protections 
too far in this case; by making incredibly offensive speech dependent upon reader 
                                               
14  While hyperbole and outrageousness are normally very distinct ideas in that outrageousness refers 
to the necessary element of an IIED claim while hyperbole is merely a claim that speech is not believable, 
the 4th circuit in this instance attributed all the speech that the Snyders and the lowers court cited as 
elements of outrageousness as hyperbolic. 
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interpretation, they created a roundabout protection for the type of speech that the 
Westboro Baptist Church participates in. If one makes overtly offensive and hyperbolic 
claims under the 4th Circuit’s ruling, they have guaranteed their own First Amendment 
protection despite the emotional injury it may have caused the target. Justice Roberts 
noted the same issue; some of the signs could be viewed as containing messages that 
referenced the Snyders. However, rather than falling down the 4th Circuit's rabbit-hole, 
he dismissed the specific signs in favor of the overall broad public issues theme 
(Shulman, 2011).  Roberts does not appear to dismiss the idea of targeting entirely, 
merely to negate its relevance in the context of this case because of the small percentage 
of targeted language in comparison to the large percentage that dealt with matters of 
public concern.   
 C) Was the case mischaracterized? 
The Court was clear in their dismissal of targeting as an aspect of the picketing. While 
they concede that several of the signs may be reasonably construed to refer to Matt 
Snyder, the signs are not direct enough to bring rise to a claim of targeting and, more 
importantly for this analysis, the dominant thrust of the speech would still have been on 
public issues. While the Justices agree that certain signs may be reasonably construed to 
refer to Matt Snyder, they dismissed the overall claim. I would argue that this dismissal 
amounted to a mischaracterization of the case. While I agree that the signs alone retain 
enough generality to escape the charge of targeting, the signs cannot be looked at in 
isolation. While, as Justice Alito pointed out, the “Epic” is certainly a targeted document, 
the press release put forth by the Westboro Baptist Church is just as damning. Within the 
press release that announced when, where, and why the Church would be picketing, the 
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Westboro Baptist Church claimed that “God Almighty killed Lance Cpl. Mathew Snyder. 
He died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God...Now in Hell—sine die” 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.6). The majority made no references to the press release at all.  
 It is also worth noting that had this case been characterized as one of targeting by 
the trial court, the claims of defamation may also have held water. Once we allow that the 
protest and, subsequently the signs displayed, did target Matthew Snyder, the signs that 
make more overt claims are worth exploring. Numerous signs were displayed which 
referenced homosexuality such as “Semper Fi Fags”, “Fag Troops”, and one depicting 
homosexual acts. A reasonable person would conclude from these signs that the church 
was suggesting that Matthew Snyder was gay, a false claim (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). 
While this certainly is not the most inflammatory claim, given his history in the military, 
an argument could be made that this sort of accusation would be harmful enough to the 
reputation of the deceased to qualify as a defamatory claim. Although the case as the 
Court examined it was not incredibly defamatory, dismissing claims of defamation was 
an excessive gesture. 
  1) Is this case even about targeting?  
 As it was decided, this case is not about targeting. The question of targeting is 
barely discussed and the ruling is delivered without a clear assessment of what targeting 
means. However, an argument can be made that this lack of clarity on the role of 
targeting is directly related to the lack of clarity associated with the decision itself. If the 
Court had ruled that the case was about targeting, the nature of the speech might have 
changed. The Court has previously determined that the First Amendment does not shield 
speech that amounts to “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
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social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.4)15. 
While the context and content of the Church’s speech is afforded First Amendment 
protection because it deals primarily with matters of public concern, that assessment of 
exactly how much of the speech is public in nature rather than private was made without 
accounting for targeting. If this speech is a targeted direct attack on a private individual, it 
seems likely that its relevance to issues of public concern decreases. Attacking the nation 
for its supposed tolerance of homosexuality is not the same as attacking individuals for 
their own (assumed) sexual preferences and the latter was not, before Snyder v. Phelps, 
afforded the same protection.  Were these comments characterized as targeted, the 
question would be whether or not they constitute personal abuse (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). 
While this may not have changed the Court's holding, it would affect the balance of the 
speech; one of the big questions leaving Snyder v. Phelps is what exactly constitutes a 
“dominant theme”? How much of one's speech can be of only private significance and 
still be awarded protection?  
 2) Does the individual the speech is directed at/about matter? 
 A very important question was brought up in oral argument that affectss the nature 
of this decision. Chief Justice Roberts questioned if it makes a difference “that Mr. 
Snyder was selected not because of who he was, but because it was a way to get 
maximum publicity for your client's particular message” (Oral Argument, 2010 p.38)?  
There is little question that the Snyders were chosen with the intent of maximizing the 
publicity of the Westboro Baptist Church's message; while this may sound like a harsh 
assessment, it is unfortunately a simple fact that neither party and none of the Justices 
                                               
15 This determination arose in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.  
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deny. This important question should be distinguished from the question of the status of a 
figure. While it is related tangentially in that Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell indicated 
that it was acceptable to use a celebrity as a platform for one's speech, this question 
seems to go beyond that mere distinction. The Hustler case only went so far as to render 
speech immunizable when the topic of discourse was a public figure.  
 What should happen, regardless of status, when the target of the speech is selected 
simply in order to gain more publicity for whatever the topic of discourse may be? The 
Westboro Baptist Church itself has stated that military funerals are where the “eyes, ears, 
hearts, and minds of the nation are focused; that is the audience” (Brief in Opposition, 
2010 p.5). As Justice Alito states in his dissenting opinion, staging a protest at Mathew 
Snyder’s funeral was merely another step in the Church’s “well-practiced strategy for 
attracting public attention” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.4).  Ms. Phelps-Roper insists that 
this motive for “maximum exposure, which every speaker pines for...does not change the 
legal principle at play” (Oral Argument, 2010 p. 38).  
It is true that currently there is nothing in the law that forbids or even restricts 
choosing a target of one's speech merely for exposure. However, from a moral standpoint, 
it seems as if there should be. One can argue that a moral debate has little place in a 
document of this nature; that assessment, I believe, overlooks the purpose of law. If the 
target of the speech has done nothing to warrant the speech, particularly in the case of 
harmful speech, there should be greater protection offered them. Why should the Court 
protect the use of an individual as a pretense under which to air their speech when that 
speech could just as easily be voiced without having included the innocent party? The 
WBC frequently protest outside of government buildings without targeting private 
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figures; these protest receive significant publicity and, due to their location, serve as an 
appropriate and effective venue for airing grievances. The majority stated that in this 
case, the “applicable legal term—emotional distress—fails to capture fully the anguish 
Westboro's choice added to Mr. Snyder's already incalculable grief” (Snyder v. Phelps, 
2011 p.10). By what logic should random chance (there were many funerals that Phelps 
could have chosen to picket that would have served the same purpose) allow this type of 
emotional injury to be sustained with no legal recourse for the victim? 
Even in the case of speech that is not offensive, it seems strange to claim that 
there is a right to use a third party as the vehicle for your protest. For example, with the 
abortion debate at full force in the nation, would there be a protection for airing a pro-life 
or pro-choice protest with a nurse as the platform for the speech? The Court took pains to 
explain that the Westboro Baptist Church’s speech was acceptable because they were not 
disguising a personal attack on Matthew Snyder or his family under the guise of a public 
concern debate. The Court did not describe any instance in which using an individual as a 
platform for public speech might exceed the protections afforded public speech. 
 Ms. Phelps-Roper and the Westboro Baptist Church claim that it is only the 
content of the speech itself that matters. As long as the speech is on matters of public 
concern, it should be protected. The majority opinion seems to affirm this stance. 
However, one must question how far this can really go. With matters of public concern as 
the sole hurdle to jump through in order to obtain First Amendment Free Speech 
protection, this seems to open the door for a speaker to berate an individual for any aspect 
of their person (Oral Argument, 2010)
16
.  While Justice Alito used race as an example, 
                                               
16 The speech would still have to be otherwise lawful in regards to police compliance and 
compliance with state law although neither of those restrictions are very arduous. 
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weight is perhaps a more appropriate example considering there is no legislation in place 
protecting individuals from derogatory speech based on weight. Should there be a 
protection for an instance in which a speaker chooses to use an obese individual as a 
platform for their speech about the looming obesity crisis in America? There is certainly a 
relation between the topic and the individual; however, the individual has done nothing to 
interject himself or herself into public debate. As Justice Alito pointed out, with a 
standard like this in place, there would be an incentive in the form of greater publicity 
garnered for using the most innocent and removed person from the issue (Oral Argument, 
2010). 
 D) Why did the Court not address public figure status?  
 Justice Sotomayor asked an important question during oral argument: “does it 
make a difference if I am directing public comments to a public or private figure” (Oral 
Argument, 2010 p. 16). The Court utterly abandoned the usual approach of looking at the 
plaintiff’s status as a public/private figure in addition to looking at the nature of speech. 
Throughout the majority of the oral argument and the entirety of the majority opinion, the 
Court looked only to the nature of the speech. To answer Justice Sotomayor's question, 
Mr. Summers attempted to relate the topic to similar logic applied to defamation cases. 
He specifically referenced the Rosenbloom and Gertz decisions. The Supreme Court 
dismissed these cases because they deal directly and only with defamation. Mr. Summers 
claims that public speech, if directed to a private person, should be treated differently 
under the law; however, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out, there is no direct theory of the 
First Amendment under which to do that (Oral Argument, 2010). Moreover, the Court 
demanded an existing Supreme Court case that would stand for this proposition. 
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Unfortunately for Mr. Summers and the Snyders, there are none. 
 With the dominant theme of the case focusing on public issues, logically N.Y. 
Times v. Sullivan should have played a large role. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan questioned 
whether Alabama's libel law infringed upon First Amendment rights by not requiring 
petitioners to provide proof of harm and by dismissing statements made about a public 
official due to factual errors (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). The Court held that 
First Amendment protects all statements, including false statements, made about a public 
figure as long as no actual malice is involved
17
. The verdict in Snyder v. Phelps is 
consistent with N.Y. Times v. Sullivan regarding the breathing space allowed the speaker. 
It was established in N.Y. Times that it is necessary to protect some false statements of 
fact in order to allow for free discourse and public debate (Sacks, 2011). Snyder v. Phelps 
appears to stand by this reasoning and strays from Sullivan only in that Snyder applies 
the same logic to a private figure rather than a public one.  
 E) Are there limits to speech on issues of public concern? 
 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan was heavily utilized regarding the statement that the First 
Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open” (New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 1964). The majority seemed to take the idea of uninhibited debate on public 
issues quite literally. There is a question that the Court failed to address concerning 
speech on issues of public concern; when issues of public concern are entangled with 
matters of private concern, should their partial standing in the realm of public concern 
                                               
17  Actual malice is making a statement with “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or 
falsity” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). This bears litte relation to the common English term 




protect them fully? The Court seems to indicate that partial standing should fully protect 
speech when discussing the “dominant thrust” of the speech being public. However, it is 
worth questioning the logic of this judgment. If a restriction was placed merely on 
bringing up the private matters of private individuals in the context of matters of public 
concern, would that truly violate the protections N.Y. Times v. Sullivan provides for 
speech? It is not speech on matters of public concern that would be restricted, but speech 
on matters of private concern being entered into a debate on public concern. It would 
stand as a mere preventative measure for conflating the two.   
 Albert Snyder had argued that the church members had launched a personal attack 
on him and his family and merely attempted to “immunize their conduct by claiming that 
they were actually protesting the United States’ tolerance of homosexuality” (Snyder v. 
Phelps, 2011 p.9). The Court did not share Snyder's concern on the topic for several 
reasons, one of which raises interesting implications. The Court noted as partial 
explanation for their lack of concern that “there was no pre-existing relationship or 
conflict between Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro's speech on public 
matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a private matter” (Snyder v. 
Phelps, 2011 p.9). Although this is certainly an accurate observation for, as Albert Snyder 
testified, he knew little about the church before the events transpired, it seems like a 
strange observation to include in this discussion. A lack of pre-existing conflict would 
only serve as evidence against speech on issues of solely private concern if a pre-existing 
conflict were somehow necessary for a private individual to verbally attack another.  
With this in mind it seems that the Court built into their ruling in Snyder v. Phelps 
a small test of the veracity of a claim for immunization on the basis of speech on matters 
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of public concern. While the Court here created a very broad protection for speech on 
matters of public concern, they do make it clear in this section that this should not be 
used as a pretext for settling a grudge or spreading hate-speech. While, as noted, pre-
existing conflict does not automatically exclude immunization for speech on matters of 
public concern, it should be cause for further analysis of the specific facts of each case. 
While this is a license for speech that may often be harmful, it is a not a free pass for all 
types of speech.   
 
V. Where could this case have gone? 
 This case has been referred to offhandedly as “half an opinion”; this title is very 
apt considering what the Court chose not to look at (Sacks, 2011). As referenced earlier, 
Plaintiff Snyder learned of the Church’s actual message and reason for protesting through 
the internet ‘Epic’ that was hosted on the Church’s official website. This colloquially 
titled 'Epic' made specific references to Matt Snyder, Albert Snyder, and Mrs. Snyder; 
these references were incredibly offensive and provably false (Shulman, 2011). 
A) The “Epic” 
  1) Why wasn't it included? 
 The “Epic” was not included in the majority’s analysis because it was not properly 
brought before the Court. The “Epic” was submitted to the jury and discussed in the 
lower courts but it was neither mentioned in Mr. Snyder’s petition for certiorari nor in his 
response to the Phelps’ statement in opposition to certiorari (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). The 
only reference Snyder made to the “Epic” was a single paragraph in his opening merits 
brief. While this rationale for excluding the “Epic” is acceptable, there may have been 
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other interests at work in the Court's decision not to take the “Epic” into account. The 
Court arguably chose not to factor the “Epic” into their analysis because, to quote Chief 
Justice Roberts directly, “an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context” 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 p.3).  
 2) How should the Courts deal with Internet Postings? 
 Although the “Epic” was swiftly dismissed by the Court within the majority 
opinion, it was referenced numerous times within the oral argument. These references 
and the discussion they sparked, give clues to where the justices stand and help to map 
out a rough guideline of where these issues might go in the future. Justice Scalia was the 
first to reference the “Epic” when questioning if the “Epic” alone would have been 
enough to support the cause of action of intrusion upon seclusion that the Snyders 
asserted. Mr. Summers claimed that it would; however, if that's true, there remains an 
issue of choice. As Justice Scalia pointed out, “it's his choice to watch them, but if he 
chooses to watch them he has a cause of action because it causes him distress” (Oral 
Argument, 2010, p. 5). Can something possibly be an intrusion upon seclusion if one 
must first actively seek it out and, once found, choose to further view it? Faulty logic 
must be at work if something can be sought and then stand as an intrusion. 
 While the “Epic” would have done little to support a claim of intrusion upon 
seclusion, it may have had a different affect on a claim of IIED. The “Epic” involved 
numerous distressing statements that were arguably willfully malicious. There are no 
rules for IIED claims concerning how the distressing material need be brought to the 
subject's attention. Albert Snyder effectively proved that the emotional distress he 
experienced as a direct result of the actions of the defendant was extreme and has caused 
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lasting physical and psychological harm. Few contest that the conduct of the WBC is 
outrageous and that it went beyond the boundaries of decency. The question of intent or 
recklessness is harder to satisfy regarding the “Epic”; once again, there are no clear rules 
established for how to deal with speech posted on the internet. If internet postings can be 
treated the same way as material publicized through other media, then the “Epic” does 
display intent on the part of the defendants; the “Epic” contained statements directed at 
the Snyders and, throughout the most offensive sections, was written as if it was meant 
for that specific audience.  
 Justice Breyer was very insistent in oral argument on the need for some clarity as 
to how similar issues should be dealt with when they are communicated over non-
traditional mediums. In a hypothetical instance where the defendant has said on television 
or on the Internet “something outrageous...and you show that it was intended to and did 
inflict serious emotional suffering. You show that any reasonable person would have 
known that likelihood” and the defendant says that they did say these intentionally 
outrageous things but “in a cause”. At that point, is it really in line with a just 
interpretation of First Amendment free speech rights for this type of speech to be 
protected? Instances of that nature, according to Breyer, are those which require a rule 
which tells us “how the First Amendment...will enter and force a balancing act” (Oral 
Argument, 2010 p. 21). Interestingly, this hypothetical that Breyer established does not 
sound too different from the case at hand, at least not with the “Epic” in mind. 
 3) Should the “Epic” have been included? 
 The question of whether or not the “Epic” should have been included in the 
Court's final analysis of the case depends on whether or not one considers the “Epic” to 
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be a distinct claim. If the “Epic” is distinct from the claims that Snyder properly raised, 
then the “Epic” was rightfully cast aside. However, the “Epic”, rather than bringing up 
different topics is merely a continuation of the conduct that the Westboro Baptist Church 
was engaged in. Its main purpose in the case would be only to clarify the position the 
Westboro Baptist Church held rather than to change the nature of their protest. While the 
Court certainly has the right to ignore parts of the record that are not properly placed 
before them, they have discretion over such decisions. Moreover, the Court did look at 
some things also not properly brought before them. If the Court truly only wanted to 
examine that which was properly brought before them in cert, why would they bring up 
irrelevant protests by the Westboro Baptist Church as evidence of their long term 
commitment to their cause (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011)? 
 One must ask if the Court intentionally avoided answering the unaddressed 
question in Hustler v. Falwell. Is speech on a matter of public concern addressed at a 
private figure actionable? (Shulman, 2011) Perhaps the Court as a whole dealt only with 
the facts of the case absent the “Epic” in order to appease individual justices. Although 
the Court dealt with the case as reviewed with relative ease and agreement, it is doubtful 
that that same level of concordance could have been met if the “Epic” had been dealt 
with. Justice Breyer perhaps could not have been swayed considering he already feared 
that the Court’s conflation of public and private speech “unreasonably limits liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Shulman, 2011). Frankly, had the “Epic” 
been included, the Court might not have been able to achieve a majority for a categorical 
assessment of the message as a private or public concern (Shulman, 2011). While the 
Court had good reason to exercise their right to exclude the “Epic” in these 
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circumstances, had it been included the Court would have been forced to define at what 
point a personal attack involving public issues creates so much of a hardship for an 
individual as to overcome First Amendment protection for matters of public concern 
(Oral Argument, 2010).  
 The importance of the “Epic” as part of the record is as a tool of clarification. 
Some of the signs displayed during the picketing are of an arguably targeted nature. The 
“Epic” serves to clear up the nature of these signs. The specific signs in question said 
“You're Going to Hell” and “God Hates You”. There were also signs specifically for the 
Marines, the military branch Matthew Snyder had been a part of (Oral Argument, 2010). 
In oral argument, Justice Ginsburg rejected that these might constitute targeting as the 
“you” could be interpreted, as the Westboro Baptist Church claims it should be, as 
referring to the whole society (Oral Argument, 2010). However, from the perspective of 
Albert Snyder, these signs, including the “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” signs displayed, 
would certainly not appear to be about the whole society but rather solely in reference to 
his son; as Mr. Summers fairly pointed out, Matthew Snyder was the only deceased 
marine at the funeral (Oral Argument, 2010). Any reasonable person would have assumed 
a connection between the messages displayed and the deceased (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). 
Although it would not later become a part of the majority opinion, Justice Alito's 
argument on this topic was of special interest. Alito argued that the “Epic” was relevant 
here in that it acts as an explanation of some of these arguably ambiguous signs. If the 
“Epic” is fully excluded from the record, ambiguity exists regarding who the real target 
of the church's message is; ambiguity that the church heavily benefits from in this case. 
However, it is erroneous to make the claim that these signs are realistically ambiguous 
 51 
 
when another document put forth by the same group clearly states who the “you” is. The 
“Epic” concisely states that the church believes Matthew Snyder is going to hell and 
hated by God. If the Court was truly to look at the whole record of this case, the “Epic” 
must be included. If included, the “Epic” discredits the argument that “you” refers to a 
larger group rather than pointedly targets Matthew Snyder (Oral Argument, 2010).  
 B) Protecting the Tort: 
 This case was in essence a tug of war between tort claims of IIED and protections 
afforded to public speech. Tort claims without a shadow of a doubt lost this battle. 
However, perhaps this case could have been resolved so as to protect free speech on 
matters of public concern without throwing all limitations by the wayside. As Justice 
Breyer indicated, “the First Amendment does not stop State tort laws in appropriate 
circumstances...and emotional injury deliberately inflicted could be one” (Oral Argument, 
2010 p.46). However, one must draw a line in such instances to avoid unnecessary 
censoring. Justice Breyer suggested several different avenues by which the Court could 
have protected both the speaker and the platform of the speech. The question of whether 
or not it is actually important for a speaker to interfere with the emotional life of an 
individual is not resolved by this case and indeed can lead to a harsh interpretation of this 
verdict. Justice Breyer had suggested having a judge, rather than a jury, decide whether or 
not it was reasonable for a speaker to have determined that it was important to interfere 
with an individual (Oral Argument, 2010). Would this pose an undue burden on public 
speech?  
 C) Should Funerals constitute unique events? 
 Much of the case turns on the simple idea that there should be no unique 
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protections afforded based on context. As has been stressed numerous times, the law must 
remain neutral. This case was thrown into the public eye because of the well-established 
idea to the lay-public that funerals are special occasions steeped in custom that demand a 
certain level of respect. Funerals, especially for the family of the deceased, are 
emotionally turbulent events that constitute their last meaningful interaction with the 
deceased. As such, using a funeral as a method of garnering public attention for one’s 
own political or social agenda is tantamount to denying the bereaved their final private 
moments (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). It’s clear that funerals are important private events. 
The question then is whether the minor restriction to First Amendment free speech rights 
that restricting protests at funerals would amount to actually outweighs the emotional 
damage visited upon the bereaved by these protests. I would argue that public debate 
would not be stifled by a content neutral restriction on funeral picketing although one 
could not have in good faith arisen from this case.  
 The majority seemed to argue that there was no place for claims of IIED at 
funerals when the speech at issue dealt with matters of public concern. They place special 
emphasis on the way that Congress and the State legislatures had stepped in and enacted 
content neutral (although some of that neutrality is currently up for debate in the lower 
courts) time, place, and manner restrictions. The Court seemed to claim that although 
there are real wounds inflicted by speech such as that which the WBC inflicted upon the 
Snyders, it is not the place of the Court to restrict freedom of speech so as to prevent such 
wounds from landing in the future. Instead, the Court suggested that these neutral laws 
passed within each state could serve the purpose of mitigating some of the harm that the 
WBC and similar groups intended to inflict. However, this claim can be countered 
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immediately. While Maryland did enact a new statute after the picketing of Matthew 
Snyder’s funeral, the WBC was in compliance with even this new statute. If content 
neutral funeral picketing restrictions are not enough to even mitigate the harm of vicious 
speech, then they clearly do not obviate the need for IIED protection in such instances 
(Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). 
 
VI. Relative importance of case 
 Even without the “Epic”, this case centers on an important question: what 
protection should be afforded speakers who make “a private party the unwilling 
instrument of their public message”? (Shulman, 2011). This topic was explored within 
Justice Sotomayor’s line of questioning during the oral argument. She began by 
referencing Cantwell v. Connecticut which specifically stated “personal abuse is 
not…communication of information safeguarded by the Constitution” (Shulman, 2011). 
Cantwell v. Connecticut involved two Jehovah’s Witnesses who traveled door-to-door and 
approached individuals on the street in order to distribute religious materials (Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 1940). Although all of those involved with the case were willing listeners, 
two individuals were enraged by the anti-Roman Catholic message they heard and called 
for the arrest of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. A local ordinance was in place requiring a 
permit for solicitation without which one was considered in breach of the peace 
(Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940). In order to arrest the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the police had 
to label their speech solicitation. The Court found that this violated the First Amendment 
right to free exercise. 
 That case is certainly distinguishable from Snyder v. Phelps in that Cantwell 
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sought to persuade only willing listeners yet the speech that would constitute a breach of 
the peace holds some relevance.  Cantwell v. Connecticut established that speech that 
breaches the peace consists of “profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the 
person of the hearer” (Shulman, 2011). While the speech during picketing does not fit this 
definition, the speech found within the “Epic” appears to. Cantwell also relates to Snyder 
in that both cases deal with the idea that although maintaining public order is important, it 
cannot be done at the expense of free communication of ideas (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
1940). 
 Within defamation cases personally targeted speech is protected only when the 
conduct of the plaintiff is of legitimate public concern. The defendant must be able to 
credibly argue there is some aspect of the plaintiff that provides the defendant’s speech 
with special protection. Can the Westboro Baptist Church make this showing for Matthew 
Snyder or his father? Unless they are trying to claim that all military personnel should be 
considered public figures, the church appears to instead be claiming that the private lives 
of private individuals are related to matters of public concern (Shulman, 2011). In 
essence, the Court appeared to create a category of absolutely protected speech within the 
public forum (Sacks, 2011). With this ruling in mind, what aspect of our private lives 
cannot be made a gratuitous part of someone’s public discourse? At what point is speech 
claiming to be on a matter of public concern of so personal a nature that it loses public 
import? Is there even a point where speech on a matter of public concern can lose this 
protection? What Constitutional rule might apply to speech that crosses this type of line? 
Moreover, what does this mean for claims of IIED?   
 On a more positive note, the case also turned the tide on the growing reach of the 
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Captive Audience Doctrine (Salamanca, 2011). Snyder v. Phelps nudged the doctrine 
back into its proper place. If someone in a public place is subjected to speech that they 
find offensive, they are ordinarily expected to look or walk away. The simple word 
“captive” clearly demonstrates the idea that one cannot claim to have been made a 
member of a captive audience as long as they possessed a reasonable avenue to escape 
that message.  
 A) Half an opinion 
 The unexplored question directly coming out of Snyder v. Phelps is whether 
speech posted on the Internet associated with political picketing receive the same level of 
protection as speech delivered through a traditional medium regardless as to how 
personal, distressing, or far from the nature of the picketing the speech may be? While the 
speech is associated with picketing in this case, this question really stands for any sort of 
Internet posting. No information on the topic comes out of Snyder v. Phelps. The big 
question mark for free speech is in how our rights and restrictions translate online. One 
state, in an attempt to erase the question, has passed an incredibly broad law dealing with 
speech online. Arizona's new bill would criminalize speech delivered through “any 
electronic or digital device” considered “obscene, lewd or profane language or . . . 
suggest[ing] a lewd or lascivious act if done with intent to ‘annoy,’ ‘offend,’ ‘harass’ or 
‘terrify.’” (Turley, 2012). While this law certainly erases questions, it seems overly broad 
and would be unlikely to stand up to Constitutional challenges. While online material 
may be treated differently than traditionally broadcast speech, the difference cannot 
reasonably be this great.  
 Will the public or private figure status of the plaintiff be considered as part of a 
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speech tort when the invasive speech is delivered through a non-traditional medium? 
Should the figure status of the plaintiff even be considered as part of a speech tort when 
the invasive speech is delivered through any medium? One of the main issues at hand in 
this case was that the rule the Petitioners were “stuck with” (to quote Mr. Summers) was 
that from Hustler v. Falwell.  Even Hustler is a strained fit to the facts of this case 
considering Falwell was a public figure while the Snyders are not (Oral Argument, 2010). 
Arguably, Snyder v. Phelps remained narrow in the areas it did because of the Court's 
hesitance to abandon, or even distinguish these facts, from the legacy of Falwell. The real 
question is why the Court was so hesitant in this regard. Several of the Justices pressured 
Mr. Summers to provide an example of a Supreme Court case that hinted that this 
distinction should matter. Although Mr. Summers could provide relevant cases from the 
Court dealing with defamation, the Court rejected them. The Court also swiftly dismissed 
the examples he provided from lower courts (Oral Argument, 2010).  
 Can extremely personal and private speech ever lose First Amendment protection 
from tort liability if it is relevant to public issues?  The Court appeared to indicate that 
“merely hitching speech on a matter of public concern to someone else’s wagon, without 
more, does not exclude it from protection (Salamanca, 2011). In the new information age 
there is a clear need to draw a line on when personal and private speech loses First 
Amendment protection, but there are no real guidelines for how or where it should be 
drawn.   
 If any of the unexplored questions had been answered, even in a narrow sense, 




B) Fundamental change to the way IIED is viewed 
 Snyder v. Phelps tests the boundaries for IIED. Although the majority opinion did 
dance around this topic, the most clear statements as to where IIED claims now fall 
appear to be within the oral argument. The majority of Ms. Phelps-Roper's defense is 
spent teasing out where she thinks these claims still hold water. The very narrow grounds 
she establishes are not directly contradicted by any of the justices within the oral 
argument and no clear statement against them is made within the majority opinion. 
Although her claims may be somewhat extreme, they do seem representative of the 
Court's verdict.  
 Ms. Phelps-Roper argues that any speech related to issues of public concern 
should be routinely protected; however, she does attempt to provide exceptions in the 
form of “any non-speech activity, like stalking, following, importuning, and being 
confrontational” (Oral Argument, 2010 p. 27). As long as a viewpoint on public issues is 
voiced, outrageous speech is protected. Moreover, Ms. Phelps-Roper claimed that the 
First Amendment never allows a claim for IIED based on speech unless the speech can be 
true or false and that this should not fall under an “inherently subjective standard” with 
adverse emotional impact as the only claim (Oral Argument, 2010 p. 31).  
 Ms. Phelps-Roper also took pains to separate claims of IIED from claims of 
Fighting Words. Fighting Words are “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942). 
This form of speech is not consider essential to the sharing of ideas and thus has minimal 
social value; “any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality” (Chaplinsy v. New Hampshire, 1942). While the 
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Court has narrowed the scope of Fighting Words in the past, they have never overturned 
this initial definition.  Fighting Words, according to Ms. Phelps-Roper, require 
imminence, proximity, and a lack of context within a broad political or social speech 
(Oral Argument, 2010). Justice Scalia questioned this definition; he seemed to be looking 
for a more broad definition of Fighting Words. This raises the question: could the 
Fighting Words doctrine take up some of the slack left behind by this new, narrow, 
criterion for claims of IIED. If Fighting Words do not require an actual fight or even 
proven potential for a fight, then it is possible that language such as that which the 
Phelps' used could, if delivered more directly, fall under the doctrine of Fighting Words. 
In his dissent, Justice Alito attempted to parallel this case to those involving defamation 
and Fighting Words although he did not claim Fighting Words directly. The majority 
responded to this with a single footnote: “no suggestion that the speech at issue falls 
within one of the categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as those 
for obscenity or 'Fighting Words'” (Snyder v. Phelps, 2011). It is interesting to note with 
this in mind that Ms. Phelps-Roper took pains to point out to the Court that “no element 
of the torts under which liability attached included Fighting Words” (Oral Argument, 
2010 p.30).  
 Snyder v. Phelps certainly changed the dynamic of free speech law. What once 
appeared to be a broad protection for private individuals from cruel and intentionally 
harmful speech is now significantly more narrow. If the Court did indeed intend to 
hollow out the shell of IIED claims, is it likely that they now offer no recourse for victims 
of this sort of distressing speech? While little has been said by the Court to indicate an 
answer to this question, it seems, based predominantly upon discussion during oral 
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argument, that the Court did see the problem inherent in reducing the scope of claims of 
IIED. I would posit that in the coming years, the Court will overcome these issues by 
offering more limitations on the boundaries of free speech in another realm. Perhaps, 
Fighting Words will fit that bill.  
  As Justice Scalia points out, there is a great degree of subjectivity to how 
Fighting Words are defined. While one needs a physical manifestation of their emotional 
injury in order to collect on a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, one 
only needs to have been angered to a degree that they would be willing to fight in order to 
bring forth a claim under Fighting Words (Oral Argument, 2010). Anger is of course not 
directly equivalent to emotional distress, yet, in the cases where both anger and emotional 
distress interact, there might be some recourse in Fighting Words. As it stands now, 
Fighting Words have been applied to only a very narrow category and have never been 
applied in a case where only emotional injury was sustained. 
 C) Where Does this Case Leave the Law Now? 
 The relative importance of this case can only fairly be judged by looking at how it 
would affect the ruling in different instances. Some sample instances were provided in 
oral argument that are worth exploring now that a verdict has been delivered. Other 
sample instances are provided in order to either explore the issues the Court chose to 
avoid or to examine further the vast scope of this decision regarding the protections it 
affords speakers when matters of public concern are brought into play.  
Figure 1.3—Hypothetical Cases  
Hypothetical Hustler Magazine. Inc. v. 
Falwell (Pre-Snyder) 
Snyder v. Phelps 
Marine serving in Iraq is, 
upon returning home to the 
Protected-while he would not 
fall under the public figure 
Protected-broadened 
protections offered to speech 
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States, being harassed and 
told he is “perpetuating the 
horrors of the American 
experience”. 
category, there would not be 
enough to serve as a claim—not 
clearly outrageous speech. 
on matters of public concern 
and the speech itself is still 
not outrageous enough to 
bring about a claim.  
Demonstrations involving 
hate speech outside a 
person's home and work 
and calling them a “war 
criminal” and worse. 
Actionable- would have claim 
as the individual is not a public 
figure and attacking an 
individual on the basis of his or 
her work outside their home 
exceeds protections offered.  
Questionable- If the speech is 
not presented in a broader 
context (i.e. you're a war 
criminal because it is criminal 
to wage imperialist war), it 
would be actionable. If it 
were presented as part of a 
broad commentary on matters 
of public concern, the speech 
would receive protection.  
Harassing the grandmother 
of a soldier killed in Iraq 
and describing to her the 
method of his death and 
the desire of the speaker to 
have witnessed it. The 
grandmother has not done 
anything to put herself in 
the public eye (Sacks, 
2011).  
Actionable-this woman is not a 
public figure, these facts are not 
so hyperbolic as to be 
unbelievable, and the speech is 
certainly intended to cause 
emotional distress.  
Questionable-The speech 
here might be actionable 
merely because the speaker 
did not adequately tie the 
speech into matters of public 
concern. If something 
involves public debate it is 
protected. This specific 
instance does not appear to. 
However, if the speaker also 
discusses why he or she 
approves of the death of her 
grandson and the death of 
soldiers in general, the 
Snyder ruling requires some 
unknown balancing act to be 
made. If the “dominant 
theme” of the speech is public 
in issue, the speech would be 
protected even if the speech 
was only leveled at the 
grandmother.  
Coming up to a person on 
the street and berating 
them on a specific aspect 
of his or herself in 
reference to how that 
aspect is bad for 
individuals to have and bad 
for America as a whole.  
Actionable- If the stranger 
accosted is a private individual, 
common interpretation of 
Hustler indicates that the speech 
would be actionable.  
Protected- There is a clear tie 
to matters of public concern 
in this instance.  The 
individual is being targeted 
but the Court's lack of answer 
on the topic implies that this 
sort of targeting is 
permissible.  
A parent of a deceased 
soldier puts out an obituary 
Actionable- Expressing a sense 
of patriotism in relation to an 
Protected- The church is 
dealing with matters of public 
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notice and says to the 
paper “I'm proud of my son 
because he died in the 
service of our country.” 
The Westboro Baptist 
Church pickets his funeral. 
event of purely private 
significance does not transform 
the grieving parent into a public 
figure. Thus the speech would 
be actionable.  
concern and, that simple 
statement of pride because of 
service to the country brought 
the parent into the public 
debate and created a 
discussion for the WBC to 
enter into.  
Outrageous Speech over 
the internet or on TV with 
intent to inflict serious 
emotional suffering in the 
name of a cause. 
Questionable- If the speech 
dealt with a public figure and 
was extremely outrageous, it 
would not support a claim. If it 
dealt with a private figure a 
claim might be supported. 
The question is entirely 
dependent upon how 
internet/television broadcasts 
are to be treated. The Snyder 
ruling has no impact on this 
example.   
If the facts of this case had 
been characterized as 
targeted speech? 
Actionable-Would have been 
able to collect as the Snyders 
are private individuals. Hustler 
provides no protection for the 
targeting of private individuals.  
Protected- The case before 
the Court arguably was 
targeted. The question 
according to the Court if 
targeting was there would still 
have been what the dominant 
theme of the case was. The 
dominant theme, according to 
the Court's analysis, was on 
matters of public concern.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Snyder v. Phelps is a fairly perplexing case. It was initially incredibly notorious 
and has since slipped from the public eye. America as a whole seems to have ignored this 
case since a decision was reached. This decision was not as harmless or as narrow as the 
Court implied. As an individual, I worry about what this case could mean for me in the 
future. We all run the risk of becoming the target of speech. Now we run a risk with no 
preventative measures to take. Under Snyder, it does not matter if you've done nothing to 
bring yourself into the public eye. The target of the speech is of minimal significance to 
the Court. While my reading of the majority opinion does not indicate that targeting is 
truly irrelevant, it appears to have been demoted to a secondary concern, if that. While 




 This case was improperly characterized as one not dealing with targeted speech. I 
stress this mischaracterization not because I believe it would have changed the verdict of 
the Court, but instead because I don't know what the impact of this may be. Of the many 
questions left behind in the wake of Snyder v. Phelps is the question of what the dominant 
thrust of speech really means. If the case had been characterized as targeting and the 
targeted signs had been taken into account, would the balance of the speech change 
significantly to the Court? If the dominant thrust of speech means simply that more of the 
speech must be about matters of public concern than about an individual and their private 
life, the case would likely have the same outcome.  
 However, perhaps the Court really did intend this decision to be narrow. If that 
was truly their intention, perhaps the narrow aspect of the decision is to be found under 
the “dominant thrust” requirement. My extensive discussion of the “Epic” has similar 
intent; the most obviously targeted speech of the WBC is found within the “Epic”. While 
I do not argue that the Court made a wrong decision in exercising its right not to hear 
something improperly brought before them in cert, I think they made a bad choice. While 
the targeted speech within the protest itself may not be significant enough to really test 
out the boundaries of the “dominant thrust” term, the “Epic” might be able to do so.  
 As the case stands, the only clear thing is that this case greatly emphasized the 
importance of matters of public concern. Most can agree, and this nation has a long 
history of protecting this idea, that matters of public concern deserve the highest 
protection as they are the backbone of free debate. However, in this instance the Court 
has gone too far in protecting speech on matters of public concern. In doing so, they have 
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asked individuals to sacrifice too much. While the nation certainly has a vested interest in 
allowing the WBC to speak out on matters of public concern, there is no such vested 
interest in protecting targeted speech or in preventing an individual from attempting to 
turn to the courts for redress against those who have intentionally caused them emotional 
harm.  
 I argue that public debate would not be stifled by permitting the Snyders to bring 
an IIED claim against the Westboro Baptist Church. Matters of public concern can be 
voiced easily without engaging in the type of speech the WBC utilizes. More importantly, 
the Snyders did not bring an IIED claim against the WBC because of their speech on 
matters of public concern, they did so because of the WBC's speech in relation to their 
son. A reasonable person is able to separate out speech on matters of public concern from 
speech that is targeted and deals with the private lives of individuals; the Court does not 
make the same distinction that a reasonable person would. As long as the “dominant 
thrust” of the speech deals with matters of public concern, harmful speech is protected. 
 While I normally would side with a decision broadening the scope of free speech, 
I fear this decision does so at too great a risk. The trade-off for living in a nation that 
protects your right to speak is that you will sometimes have to hear things you consider 
crude or offensive. However, the cost of free speech should not be that an individual must 
endure speech targeted at them so as to intentionally cause them harm. This sort of 
speech does not deserve such high protection. The Court may not have purposefully 
given speech that intentionally inflicts emotional distress this protection, but by banning 
an IIED claim on these grounds they have done so. The Court seems to have created a 
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